Public Policy Objections to Enforcing a Foreign Arbitral Award in Turkiye

A Turkish court can refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if recognition or enforcement would be contrary to Turkish public policy, but this ground is applied narrowly and is reserved for serious violations of fundamental legal principles, not simply disagreement with how the tribunal decided the case. A debtor cannot use public policy as a general vehicle to reopen the merits of the award.

The public policy exception exists to prevent Turkish courts from being compelled to give effect to outcomes that would offend the most basic principles underlying the Turkish legal order, such as fraud in the arbitral process or a manifest violation of fundamental rights. It is not designed to allow a losing party a second opportunity to argue that the tribunal reached the wrong result on the facts or the law.

Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention permits refusal of enforcement where recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought. Articles 60 to 63 of Law No. 5718 on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure (MOHUK), which govern recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Türkiye, incorporate this same standard as applied to awards falling within their scope.

Turkish courts have consistently emphasised that public policy review in the context of foreign award enforcement is narrower than a general appeal, and does not permit re-examination of the tribunal's factual findings or its interpretation of the applicable substantive law. Refusal on public policy grounds has generally been reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as a serious defect undermining the integrity of the arbitral process itself, rather than a dispute over whether the tribunal's reasoning was correct.

Commentators generally support a restrictive approach to the public policy exception, consistent with the pro-enforcement orientation of the New York Convention internationally, while also recognising the need for a safety valve in truly exceptional cases. Debate continues over how public policy should be distinguished from related grounds such as due process violations or arbitrability, since these grounds can sometimes overlap in a single set of facts.

A debtor invoking public policy must identify a specific, serious defect that goes beyond ordinary disagreement with the outcome, such as evidence of fraud, corruption, or a fundamental denial of a fair process, and should be prepared for Turkish courts to scrutinise such claims closely given the narrow scope this ground is given in practice.

The objection is raised within the enforcement proceedings, following the general procedural deadlines for submitting a defence under Turkish civil procedure, and should be supported by evidence gathered as early as possible given the high threshold the debtor must meet.

The competent Turkish civil court of first instance handling the enforcement action reviews the public policy objection as part of the statutory grounds for refusal under the New York Convention framework as applied through Turkish law.

Supporting material should focus on concrete evidence of the alleged defect, such as documentation of fraud or serious procedural irregularity in the arbitral process, rather than argument directed at the substantive correctness of the tribunal's decision, which Turkish courts will not revisit.

A frequent mistake is treating public policy as a general appeal mechanism, presenting arguments that the tribunal simply got the law or the facts wrong, which does not meet the threshold Turkish courts apply. Another mistake is failing to distinguish public policy from other, more specific grounds under the New York Convention, such as due process or arbitrability, which have their own separate standards and should be argued distinctly where applicable.

Debtors considering a public policy defence should assess honestly, at an early stage, whether the facts genuinely disclose a serious defect of the kind Turkish courts recognise, since arguments framed merely as disagreement with the tribunal's reasoning rarely succeed and can consume resources better directed elsewhere.